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Overview
The  Technology  Innovation  Management  Review  (TIM 
Review) provides insights about the issues and emerging 
trends  relevant  to  launching  and  growing  technology 
businesses.  The  TIM  Review  focuses  on  the  theories, 
strategies,  and  tools  that  help  early-stage  technology 
companies succeed.
Our readers are looking for practical ideas they can apply 
within their own organizations. The TIM Review brings 
together  diverse  viewpoints  –  from  academics,  entre-
preneurs,  companies  of  all  sizes,  the  public  sector,  the 
third  sector,  and  others  –  to  bridge  the  gap  between 
theory and practice. In particular, we focus on the topics 
of  managing  innovation,  technology  entrepreneurship, 
economic development, and open source business.
Recent Issues
• Miscellany (August)
• Women Entrepreneurs (July)
• Technology Entrepreneurship (June)
• Technology Entrepreneurship (May)
• Collectives (April)
Upcoming Issues
We  welcome  input  from  readers  into  upcoming 
themes. Please visit timreview.ca to suggest themes and 
nominate authors and guest editors.
Contribute
You can contribute to the TIM Review in the following 
ways:
• Read and comment on past articles and blog posts.  
• Review the upcoming themes and tell us what topics
   you would like to see covered.
• Consider writing an article for a future issue;  see the
   author guidelines and editorial process for details.
• Recommend colleagues as authors or guest editors.
• Give feedback on the website or any other aspect of this
   publication.
• Sponsor or advertise in the TIM Review.
• Tell a friend or colleague about the TIM Review.
Please contact the Editor if you have any questions or 
comments: timreview.ca/contactTechnology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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Editorial: Introducing the TIM Review
Chris McPhee, Editor-in-Chief
It  is  my  great  pleasure  to  introduce  the  Technology
Innovation Management Review.
The TIM Review is the new name for the Open Source 
Business  Resource  (OSBR),  which  we  have  been  pub-
lishing on a monthly basis since 2007 from the Techno-
logy  Innovation  Management  program  at  Carleton 
University  in  Ottawa,  Canada  (http://carleton.ca/tim). 
In  the  final  issue  of  the  OSBR,  I  described  how  the 
journal  began  with  an  emphasis  on  the  business  of 
open source, but has evolved over the years to focus on 
the theories, strategies, and tools that help early-stage 
technology  companies  succeed  (McPhee,  2011;
http://timreview.ca/article/465).  While  open  source 
business  will  very  much  remain  a  topic  of  interest,  it 
will be joined by a focus on innovation management, 
technology  entrepreneurship,  and  economic  develop-
ment.
The new publication formalizes a change in scope, but 
also carries on the tradition of providing insightful con-
tent  aimed  at  top  teams  that  launch  and  grow 
technology companies. The TIM Review will bring to-
gether  diverse  viewpoints  from  academics,  entrepren-
eurs, companies of all sizes, the public sector, the third 
sector, and others to share insights and practical ideas 
that readers can apply to their own organizations. 
Along  with  the  new  name  and  scope,  we  have 
developed  a  new  website  (http://timreview.ca),  which 
includes the archive of OSBR articles, now accessible by 
issue  or  by  topic.  The  evolution  of  the  website  is 
ongoing,  but  we  believe  it  already  provides  increased 
opportunities for discovery and discussion. 
We would like to thank the faculty and students of the 
TIM program and other staff at Carleton University for 
their  help  in  the  transition  to  the  TIM  Review.  In 
particular,  I  would  like  to  acknowledge  the  efforts  of 
Nathaniel Hudson for leading the website development 
work. 
We  are  also  grateful  for  the  valuable  feedback  from 
readers and authors, our Advisory Board, and our new 
Review  Board,  who  have  collectively  shaped  the  new 
publication and will continue to help evolve it. Please 
keep telling us what is working, what is not, and how 
we can make the TIM Review better.
In this first issue of the TIM Review, we feature a collec-
tion of five articles from authors within our ecosystem:
Tony  Bailetti,  Director  of  the  Technology  Innovation 
Management program, describes the importance of stu-
dent entrepreneurship and proposes a model by which 
universities can increase the number of student spinoff 
companies. He recommends that senior university ad-
ministrators  use  a  results-based  management  ap-
proach, guided by a set of principles anchored around 
the proposed model of student entrepreneurship.
Michael Weiss, Associate Professor in the Department 
of Systems and Computer Engineering at Carleton Uni-
versity, retraces the evolution of software product devel-
opment  to  illustrate  a  shift  from  a  single-company, 
product-line development approach to software ecosys-
tems  and  collectives.  With  particular  emphasis  on  a 
case study of the Eclipse open source software ecosys-
tem, he describes his recent research to develop a mod-
el that will help potential members decide whether or 
not to join a collective. The model links factors that af-
fect the economics of software development collectives 
(level  of  contribution,  number  of  members,  and  di-
versity  of  use)  to  economic  outcomes  (time,  quality, 
and cost). 
Mika  Westerlund  from  the  University  of  California 
Berkeley and Aalto University and Seppo Leminen from 
Laurea  University  and  Aalto  University,  explore  the 
challenges companies face when moving from a tradi-
tional, closed development approach to one where they 
co-create  with  customers.  They  identify  and  describe 
four distinct steps of open innovation based on their re-
cent research with living labs. Finally, they discuss the 
differences between conventional, project-based devel-
opment and the open innovation model, with an em-
phasis on the managerial challenges that come with a 
shift to greater openness and customer-led co-creation.
Peter  Carbone  reflects  upon  his  experiences  with  ac-
quisition integration as an executive at Nortel and ex-
tracts  principles  that  can  help  both  large  companies 
and  startups  negotiate  an  appropriate  integration  ap-
proach following acquisition. With insights and lessons 
learned from six Nortel acquisitions, he describes four 
models of integration and the factors that can contrib-
ute to their success.Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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Ian Gilbert and Stephen Davies from Third Core Ven-
ture  Expansion  Partners  outline  a  sales  execution 
strategy guide for technology startups. They argue that 
much of the assistance offered to startups is focused on 
solution development and product-level commercializ-
ation, with less attention given to the execution of sales. 
In their article, they describe the reasons why sales exe-
cution  strategies  are  commonly  overlooked  and  offer 
practical tips for startups to put such a strategy in place 
– and execute it – in order to maximize revenue. 
In November, we offer another collection of articles on 
topics that reflect the new scope of the publication. Fol-
lowing this, we will return to the tradition of publishing 
issues around specific editorial themes. We encourage 
you to suggest themes you would like to see covered in 
future issues. 
We  hope  you  enjoy  the  first  issue  of  the  TIM  Review 
and will share your comments on articles online. Please 
also  feel  free  to  contact  us  directly  with  feedback  or 
article submissions: http://timreview.ca/contact
About the Author
Chris  McPhee  is  Editor-in-Chief  of  the  Technology 
Innovation Management Review and is in the Tech-
nology  Innovation  Management  program  at  Car-
leton University in Ottawa. Chris received his BScH 
and MSc degrees in Biology from Queen's University 
in Kingston, following which he worked in a variety 
of  management,  design,  and  content  development 
roles  on  science  education  software  projects  in 
Canada and Scotland.
Citation: McPhee, C. 2011. Editorial: Introducing the TIM 
Review. Technology Innovation Management Review. 
October 2011:3-4. Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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Letters to the Editor
Dear Editor-in-Chief,
Please accept my enthusiastic applause on the transformation of the Open Source Business 
Resource into the Technology Innovation Management Review!  This publication is perfectly 
timed to respond to the issues experienced by the growing number of early-stage technology 
companies in Canada and around the world in the current economic and regulatory context.  
I am delighted that this important publication will be located at Carleton University where we 
enjoy the leadership of some of the finest professors in the world like Dr. Tony Bailetti, to 
name but one of many.  It is appropriate that the publication reside at Carleton where the 
university’s commitment to engaging with industry and creating a context for collaborative 
work to find solutions to real-world problems is nothing short of remarkable.
The Technology Innovation Management program has generated theses and projects that 
feature innovative solutions to real-world problems. The Lead to Win program has matched 
the energy of nascent entrepreneurs with the need of the region, the expertise of our faculty 
and the experience of alumni who work as mentors to current students.  The result is an 
impressive number of new enterprises which are both effective and profitable.
The doctoral program in the Sprott School of Business has generated dissertations and 
research projects which explore the relationship between leadership styles and the generation 
of creative ideas, the environment and corporate structures favoring change and the talents of 
the local workforce, the possibility of international cooperation as a solution to local problems.
The outreach of Carleton’s Co-op Programs, community volunteer projects, and the 
involvement of alumni as investors, coaches, mentors and advisors are key factors in the 
success of the university’s involvement in regional economic development.
I wish you every success with this important endeavor and look forward to reading it myself.
Sincerely yours,
Roseann O’Reilly Runte
President, Carleton UniversityTechnology Innovation Management Review October 2011
6 www.timreview.ca
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Dear Editor-in-Chief,
Congratulations on the launch of the Technology Innovation Management Review!  
Based on the experience and reputation of the Open Source Business Resource, this new 
publication will have an even greater impact by broadening its scope from the theory and 
practice of open source businesses to that of early-stage technology enterprises in general. 
The review of emerging trends and technologies by and for a diverse audience of academics 
and practitioners will foster innovative solutions to the real-world problems faced by tech 
companies in their early growth stages. 
The TIM Review builds on the success of Carleton’s Technology Innovation Management 
program – a unique, interdisciplinary master’s program that bridges the gap between 
engineering and business to support the growth of new technology companies and business 
ecosystems.  The program launched in the mid-90s, and has resulted in many successes, 
among which include the creation of numerous start-up companies. 
The TIM Review, along with the Technology Innovation Management and Lead to Win 
programs, as well as the new entrepreneurship programs designed by the Sprott School of 
Business for all students at Carleton, will play an important role in the economic development 
of our region and beyond. 
We anticipate exciting things from this new initiative and look forward to being a part of a 
growing readership.
Sincerely,
Rafik Goubran Jerry Tomberlin
Dean, Faculty of Engineering Dean, Sprott School of Business
Carleton University Carleton UniversityTechnology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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Fostering Student Entrepreneurship
and University Spinoff Companies
Tony Bailetti
Introduction
Today’s academic institutions are adding economic de-
velopment to their more traditional mandates of teach-
ing and research (Hoskisson et al., 2011: http://tinyurl
.com/3tkdepv;  Rothaermel,  et  al.,  2007:  http://tinyurl
.com/4xaacr8). Accordingly, the need to foster student 
entrepreneurship  has  become  increasingly  important 
for senior university administrators worldwide. 
There  is  a  risk  however,  that  policies  fostering  entre-
preneurship at a university may miss out on key schol-
arly  insights  and  concrete  practical  experience.  The 
literature  on  student  entrepreneurship  has  grown  in 
varied directions, making it difficult for universities to 
formulate effective policies. Lessons learned from prac-
tical  experiences  with  student  entrepreneurs  are  not 
widely available. The research findings and intuitive un-
derstanding around student entrepreneurs can be diffi-
cult to understand for senior university administrators 
interested  in  adopting  effective  university-wide  policy 
principles  promoting  student  entrepreneurship  for 
commercial and social enterprises. 
This  article  focuses  on  those  students  who  establish 
new  companies  to  commercialize  opportunities  using 
knowledge they acquired through their studies at uni-
versity.  This  article  is  not  concerned  about  university 
students  working  in  projects  commissioned  by  large 
companies, nor is it about students who commercialize 
A student spinoff company strives to transform knowledge acquired by students into an in-
come-generating business. This article outlines how a university can increase the number 
of spinoff companies created by its student entrepreneurs. 
Student spinoff companies are of interest to all forward-thinking universities, particularly 
those that support research and teaching programs in the field of entrepreneurship. The 
spinoff companies provide tangible evidence that students acquire viable entrepreneurial 
skills while studying at the university. In addition, student spinoff companies contribute to 
regional economic development, commercialize knowledge that otherwise would go un-
developed, help universities attain and expand their core missions, and increase the re-
turn on the investments in university R&D. 
University policies developed specifically for student spinoff companies significantly af-
fect the growth potential of such ventures. This article provides a model and a set of prin-
ciples  that  universities  can  use  to  support  and  increase  the  number  of  student 
entrepreneurs  at  their  institutions.  The  model  and  principles  are  grounded  in  research 
findings and practical experience. In addition, the article suggests that universities adopt a 
results-based management approach to plan and deploy initiatives to support student en-
trepreneurs. The approach is widely used by government agencies interested in increasing 
the outcomes from their investments. 
Entrepreneurs  do  more  than  anybody  thinks  possible 
with less than anybody thinks possible, regardless of the 
field in which they work.
John Doerr
Funder of Netscape, Google, and Amazon 
“ ”Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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knowledge  by  means  other  than  launching  new  com-
panies  (e.g.,  licensing  technology  to  an  established 
firm),  who  commercialize  opportunities  with  know-
ledge acquired from non-university sources, or who are 
participants in business plan or idea competitions. 
Student spinoff companies can be founded by students 
attending programs in any faculty at a university. These 
companies operate independently from the university; 
they  have  their  own  legal,  technical,  and  commercial 
structures.
A student spinoff company transforms knowledge that 
students acquire at a university into revenues from: i) 
new  products,  services,  technology,  tools,  and  solu-
tions; ii) new quality of goods; iii) new methods of pro-
duction;  iv)  opening  new  markets;  v)  securing  new 
sources of supply of raw materials; and vi) new organiz-
ational forms. 
This article proceeds as follows. First, the importance of 
student  spinoff  companies  is  examined.  Second,  the 
distinct  and  salient  aspects  of  student  entrepreneurs 
are  identified.  Third,  a  model  to  increase  the  level  of 
student entrepreneurship at a university is introduced. 
Fourth, a set of principles anchored around the model 
are identified. Fifth, a recommendation is provided to 
encourage senior university administrators to use a res-
ults-based management approach to manage their initi-
atives to increase the level of student entrepreneurship. 
Conclusions then follow. 
Why Are Student Spinoff Companies Import-
ant?
Student  spinoff  companies  are  important  for  at  least 
five reasons: 
1. Student spinoff companies offer concrete proof that 
the university from which they emanate is relevant, up-
to-date, and competitive. These proof points attract tal-
ented students, faculty, partners, and donors; generate 
private  and  public  sector  investment;  and  strengthen 
links to important regional and international networks. 
2. They contribute to the economic development of the 
region  where  the  university  is  located.  They  generate 
jobs (including jobs for students and knowledge-intens-
ive jobs), diversify the local economy, satisfy customer 
needs, and attract talent and investment. 
3.  They  commercialize  knowledge  that  may  otherwise 
go undeveloped within the university. Transforming “in 
house” knowledge into sellable goods is expensive and 
uncertain. Most universities do not have the skills, will-
power,  discipline,  financial  resources,  space,  and  net-
works required to transform university knowledge into 
a wide range of commercial goods. In many cases, stu-
dent spinoff companies are required to transform uni-
versity  knowledge  into  market  offers,  attract  capital, 
and validate customer value. 
4.  They  help  universities  accomplish  their  core  mis-
sions  of  research,  teaching,  and  community  develop-
ment. Student spinoffs provide faculty with knowledge 
that is useful for educating students, and they increase 
awareness  of  the  practical  value  of  undertaking  uni-
versity research.
5. They increase the return on government investment 
in university R&D. Policy makers and taxpayers are in-
creasingly concerned about the low returns from gov-
ernment  investment  in  university  R&D.  Michelacci 
(2003;  http://tinyurl.com/68pvg3e)  has  shown  that, 
when the stock of knowledge is high and the amount of 
entrepreneurial skill is low, an increase in R&D reduces 
economic  growth.  When  entrepreneurial  skills  at  the 
university  are  low,  returns  on  large  R&D  investments 
are  also  low.  In  addition  to  being  knowledge-transfer 
mechanisms,  student  spinoff  companies  increase  the 
level  of  entrepreneurial  activity  at  a  university,  which 
then increases the university’s return on its R&D. 
What Are the Distinct and Salient Aspects of 
Student Entrepreneurs? 
Student entrepreneurs use university knowledge to re-
cognize  opportunities  and  develop,  launch,  and  oper-
ate  new  companies  to  exploit  them.  This  definition  is 
consistent with the definitions of entrepreneurship con-
tributed  by  Shane  (2003;  http://tinyurl.com/6yy3yqy) 
and  Hoskisson,  Covin,  Volberda,  and  Johnson  (2011;
http://tinyurl.com/3tkdepv). 
There are at least five distinct and salient aspects to stu-
dent entrepreneurs:
1.  They  use  their  university  education  to  develop  the 
three  core  capabilities  that  underlie  venture  creation. 
According  to  Rasmussen  and  colleagues  (2011;
http://tinyurl.com/6xdn4cd), these three core capabilit-Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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ies  are:  opportunity  refinement,  resource  acquisition, 
and venture championing.
2. They rely on the university’s reputation and networks 
to  reach  the  credibility  thresholds  of  their  ventures. 
Rasmussen and colleagues (2011) define the credibility 
threshold of a venture as the establishment of an entre-
preneurial team and acquisition of resources required 
by the venture. 
3. They learn to be more self-reliant than peers carrying 
out venture initiatives in large corporations. Unlike cor-
porate venturing, student entrepreneurs learn that they 
cannot  count  on  the  university  to  provide  them  with 
the resources they require to develop their ventures. As 
a  result,  they  tend  to  think  of  resources  as  tools  that 
provide them with requisite services rather than feeling 
the  need  to  own  those  resources.  Student  entrepren-
eurs focus on the applications, not the attributes of the 
resources. 
4.  The  quality  of  their  educational  experience  is  very 
much influenced by the quality of their entrepreneurial 
experience while studying at the university. Student en-
trepreneurs expect more than lectures on entrepreneur-
ship; they expect to interact with faculty who can help 
them attain their entrepreneurial-related goals. 
5. They use the university to develop weak, strong, and 
bridging network ties. Weak ties provide them with new 
knowledge  and  information.  Strong  ties  provide  re-
sources,  legitimacy,  and  sensitive  information  ex-
change.  Bridging  ties  provide  market  and  customer 
information as well as capability to expand current cap-
abilities  (Hoskisson  et  al.,  2011;  http://tinyurl.com/
3tkdepv). 
Factors that Affect the Number of Student 
Spinoff Companies
Various entrepreneurship theories exist. In this section, 
we build on the knowledge-based theory of entrepren-
eurship  (Acs  et  al.,  2005:  http://tinyurl.com/3q46kzq; 
Acs  et  al.,  2009:  http://tinyurl.com/3dlctbe)  and  the 
subjectivist  theory  of  entrepreneurship  (Mahoney  and 
Michael,  2005;  http://tinyurl.com/42p9fhv)  to  develop 
a model for the purpose of organizing policy principles 
to foster the creation of student spinoff companies. Six 
constructs were identified as determining the number 
of student entrepreneurs in a university at a given time 
(dependent  variable),  as  shown  in  Figure  1  and  de-
scribed below: 
A  and  B:  Students  use  university-based  knowledge  to 
develop  opportunities  within  the  university.  The 
Figure 1. Factors that affect the level of student entrepreneurship at a universityTechnology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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amount of knowledge available to students is expressed 
as the product of two factors: the total stock of know-
ledge  available  at  the  university  and  the  portion  of 
knowledge that the university allows students to com-
mercialize. If university policy assigns all rights over the 
university’s  stock  of  knowledge  to  students,  then  the 
number of student entrepreneurs launching companies 
is likely to increase.
C:  When  comparing  the  projected  profits  from  entre-
preneurship  to  the  expected  wages  from  employment 
inside or outside the university, the greater the dispar-
ity between profits over wages, the higher the level of 
students launching startups. 
D: Students need to develop three core entrepreneur-
ship capabilities: identify and refine an opportunity, ac-
quire resources, and champion a venture. The stronger 
are the entrepreneurship capabilities of university stu-
dents, the greater is the number of students launching 
startups. 
E and F: The literature has identified barriers to entre-
preneurship (Shane, 2003; http://tinyurl.com/6yy3yqy), 
which can be organized into two categories: university 
barriers and regional barriers. University barriers to en-
trepreneurship include lack of social acceptance of stu-
dent  entrepreneurs,  tensions  between  academic  and 
commercial outputs, lack of people with business exper-
ience and commercial skills, and inefficient technology 
transfer  offices.  Regional  barriers  to  entrepreneurship 
include  regulatory,  legal,  administrative,  employment, 
financial,  and  partnership  burdens.  For  example,  in 
some regions, student entrepreneurs need one day to re-
gister a company; in other regions, they need 20 weeks. 
Some regions require skill qualification or the elabora-
tion of a business plan certified by a business expert at-
testing  to  the  company’s  viability.  In  some  regions, 
students lack access to bank and trade credit. 
Figure  1  illustrates  that  the  number  of  student  entre-
preneurs at a university is positively affected by: i) the 
stock of knowledge at the university; ii) the fraction of 
stock  of  knowledge  that  students  can  commercialize, 
iii)  the  expected  excess  of  profits  from  entrepreneur-
ship  minus  wages  from  employment,  and  iv)  the  stu-
dents’  entrepreneurial  capabilities.  It  also  illustrates 
that  the  higher  the  university  and  regional  barriers  to 
entrepreneurship, the lower the number of student en-
trepreneurs. 
Principles to Increase the Number of Stu-
dent Spinoff Companies 
Table 1 provides principles that can be used to develop 
university policies for increasing the number of spinoff 
companies created by university students. These prin-
ciples are organized around the six factors illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
The principles provided in this section link the descript-
ive  nature  of  scientific  research  with  the  action-ori-
ented nature of policy-making practices, as advocated 
by proponents of the science-based approach (Romme 
and  Endenburg,  2006;  http://tinyurl.com/6aowwcz). 
These principles use practical experience gained help-
ing  graduate  students  at  Carleton  University  launch 
their  businesses  to  expand  on  the  principles  reported 
by  van  Burg,  Romme,  Gilsing  and  Reymen  (2008;
http://tinyurl.com/3v3787c) and Gilsing, van Burg and 
Romme (2010; http://tinyurl.com/3w7s4q3). 
A Results-Based Management Approach to 
Creating Student Spinoff Companies
Senior  university  administrators  can  use  a  results-
based  management  approach  to  increase  the  level  of 
student entrepreneurs. The results-based management 
approach  looks  beyond  investment  in  activities  and 
outputs, focusing on specific results of investments (Ca-
nadian  International  Development  Agency,  2008;
http://tinyurl.com/3jy985q).  With  this  type  of  ap-
proach, the use of three tools to manage initiatives in 
fostering  the  creation  of  students’  spinoff  companies 
may prove quite helpful. These tools include: i) a logic 
model; ii) a performance measurement framework; and 
iii) an investment risk management template. Examples 
of  the  three  tools  used  by  the  Canadian  International 
Development Agency can be accessed here: http://tiny
url.com/3lnnde6
The  logic  model  illustrates  the  logical  relationships 
between  inputs,  activities,  outputs,  immediate  out-
comes, intermediate outcomes, and final outcome of a 
university  initiative  to  increase  its  number  of  student 
entrepreneurs.  The  inputs,  activities,  and  outputs  ad-
dress the “how” of the initiative, whereas the immedi-
ate,  intermediate,  and  final  outcomes  provide  the 
actual “changes” that take place as a result of investing 
in the initiative.Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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Table 1. Principles to foster student entrepreneurship at a universityTechnology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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A  university  can  use  the  performance  measurement 
framework to prepare and implement a plan that sys-
tematically  collects  relevant  data  over  the  lifetime  of 
the  student  spinoff  creation  initiative  and  to  demon-
strate progress made in achieving expected results. 
The  investment  risk  register  outlines  the  operational, 
financial,  developmental,  and  reputational  risks  of  a 
university initiative to increase numbers of student en-
trepreneurs  and  defines  the  corresponding  risk  re-
sponse strategies. 
Conclusions 
Today’s universities are adding economic development 
to their teaching and research mandates. Fostering stu-
dent entrepreneurship for commercial and social pur-
poses therefore has become increasingly important for 
senior university administrators worldwide. 
We all face the challenge to do right for our student en-
trepreneurs and institutionalize the pertinent processes 
and  values  required  to  support  the  creation  of  their 
companies. 
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Economics of Software Product
Development Collectives
Michael Weiss
Introduction
The traditional view of software development is that it 
occurs within a single company. While parts of the de-
velopment may be sourced from outside the company, 
the final product has been specified, and is owned in 
full, by the company. When a company develops mul-
tiple products in the same domain, it benefits from or-
ganizing its software development activity as a product 
line (http://sei.cmu.edu/productlines).
A  product-line  provides  a  platform  (also  known  as  a 
core asset base) shared by a set of related products that 
are developed by an organization. The shared platform 
identifies  points  of  commonality  and  variation. 
Products are created on top of the platform by reusing 
its  core  assets,  while  reducing  the  effort  that  goes  to-
wards developing assets that are unique to the product.
The motivation for a product line is reducing the cost of 
developing new products while increasing their quality 
and reducing the time to market. By taking a product 
line  approach,  a  company  can  manage  product  di-
versity and reuse more systematically. In other words, 
products built using a product line approach will share 
a  common  base,  which  allows  a  company  to  manage 
customer-specific variations more systematically. 
This traditional view is being challenged by two recent 
developments: a transition from software product lines 
to software ecosystems (Bosch, 2009; http://tinyurl.com
/3gfr5lg) and a transition from software ecosystems to 
collectives. A transition from product lines to software 
ecosystems  takes  place  when  a  product-line  company 
makes its platform available to developers outside the 
company.  These  include  internal  developers  (as  in  a 
product  line),  strategic  partners  with  long-term  rela-
tionships,  undirected  external  developers,  and  inde-
pendent solution providers.
The transition from software ecosystems to collectives 
recently has created many new collectives, even though 
they  often  go  by  different  names,  including  “ecosys-
tems”.  Examples  are  the  open  source  Eclipse  project 
(http://eclipse.org) and the closed source Artop ecosys-
tem (http://www.artop.org). A collective is set up when 
Where software product development occurs is shifting from single companies to groups 
or  collectives  of  companies.  In  this  article,  we  retrace  the  evolution  of  how  software 
product development is organized and then offer insights into the economic motivation 
for collectives, which will be relevant to companies considering joining a software product 
development collective. Building on the literature on software product line economics, we 
identify three factors affecting the economics of collectives (level of contribution, number 
of members, and diversity of use), and develop a model that links those factors to three 
economic  outcomes  (time,  quality,  and  cost).  This  model  can  be  used  by  potential 
members when deciding whether or not to join a collective.
Define very precisely what your competitive differentiators 
are  for  your  customers  or  you’re  going  out  of  business. 
Focus  all  possible  energies  there,  and  acquire  everything 
else  from  open  source  software,  or  help  build  it  in  open 
source  software.  Or  in  other  words:  pick  your  niche;  co-
evolve  the  platform  in  collaboration  with  other  actors  in 
the ecosystem.
Mike Milinkovich
Executive Director, Eclipse
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a group of organizations wants to achieve a goal they 
cannot achieve on their own. A collective can address 
common needs of its members, allowing them to focus 
on the differentiating features of their products. 
It is often observed that somewhere between 50% and 
90% of development effort is spent on creating software 
that does not differentiate a company from its competit-
ors  (van  der  Linden,  2009:  http://tinyurl.com/6ef7p22; 
Milinkovich,  2008:    http://tinyurl.com/6aguklw).  Only 
the remainder differentiates a company from its com-
petitors. This observation has motivated companies to 
acquire  the  non-differentiating  parts  of  their  software 
stack  elsewhere,  for  example,  as  COTS  (http://wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Commercial_off-the-shelf) or open source 
software. When such software is not available, or when 
a higher degree of control over the software is desired 
to  enable  more  effective  customization,  organizations 
have  joined  efforts  to  create  their  own  common  soft-
ware  stack  in  a  collaborative  effort,  making  the  result 
available  to  each  other,  or  even  to  anyone  else  who 
wishes to use it.
This article seeks to identify the factors that affect the 
economics of collectives and to create a model linking 
those  factors  to  economic  outcomes.  It  develops  pro-
positions from case studies of collectives about how the 
composition of a collective affects the achievement of 
the business goals of their members. The propositions 
link three characteristics of collectives (level of contri-
bution,  number  of  members,  and  diversity  of  use)  to 
three variables used to model the economics of product 
lines (time, quality, and cost).
Collectives
A collective can achieve things that its individual mem-
bers cannot achieve on their own, as described in the 
April  2011  issue  (http://timreview.ca/issue/2011/april) 
of this publication. For example, as a collective, a group 
of startups can deliver a complete solution to a custom-
er,  whereas  individually  they  are  only  able  to  deliver 
pieces of the solution, which the customer has to integ-
rate. Joining forces makes the group of startups much 
more competitive against large system integrators. Col-
lectives can also collaborate to address common needs, 
allowing their members to focus on the differentiating 
features of their products. The more members a collect-
ive has, the more its members are able to share the load 
of  meeting  common  needs.  However,  such  collabora-
tion is also fraught with problems, for example, the co-
ordination  overhead  that  results  from  dependencies 
between subtasks. 
A key characteristic of collectives is that they are volun-
tary organizations. Membership in a collective is a func-
tion of how well the collective helps its members meet 
their business goals. 
As contributors to the collective, members gain access 
to the total value generated by the collective. Previous 
research has shown that, as long as the total value re-
ceived is higher than the cost of contribution, members 
benefit  from  joining  (Baldwin  and  Clark,  2006;
http://tinyurl.com/3qygf9y). Conversely, existing mem-
bers of a collective are not interested in members who 
do not add value to the collective. Thus, collectives of-
ten impose conditions on membership such as asking 
members to commit resources.
Figure 1 summarizes the transitions from a single com-
pany  to  a  collective  model  of  developing  software 
products. The transitions occur along two dimensions. 
The  first  transition  is  from  an  internal  to  an  external 
activity, as the platform is made available to external de-
velopers. The second transition is from a hierarchical to 
a  network  type  of  governance.  The  locus  of  creation 
and evolution of the platform shifts from a single plat-
form owner to a network that collectively creates and 
owns the platform.
Case Study: Eclipse
In the research underlying this article, we studied sever-
al cases both from firsthand observation and the literat-
ure. From these cases, we identified factors that affect 
the economics of collectives and created a model that 
links those factors to economic outcomes. The model is 
described  as  a  set  of  propositions  or  statements  that 
suggest  causal  links  between  the  factors  and  the  eco-
nomic  outcomes.  A  summary  of  each  case  was  pre-
pared that described its purpose, governance structure, 
and  software  architecture.  Factors  and  economic  out-
comes were identified in an iterative manner. 
In this section, we describe one of our case studies in 
detail:  the  Eclipse  project.  Eclipse  is  an  open  source 
community focused on building an open software de-
velopment  platform  (Smith  and  Milinkovich,  2007;
http://timreview.ca/article/94). The Eclipse project was 
founded in 2001 as a spin-out of technology that IBM 
had  acquired  from  Object  Technology  International. 
Initially,  the  Eclipse  community  was  primarily  driven 
by IBM and other software vendors. In 2004, with the 
creation  of  an  independent,  non-profit  governance 
body  –  the  Eclipse  Foundation  –  IBM  relinquished  its 
control over the project and allowed other players, in-Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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cluding IBM's competitors, to become equal members 
of the community.
The Eclipse Foundation is responsible for the technical 
infrastructure,  coordinating  the  development  process, 
handling  the  intellectual  property  rights,  and  promot-
ing Eclipse and its wider ecosystem. The role of the Ec-
lipse Foundation is administrative; it does not set the 
direction of the project or develop code. The direction 
of the project is set by strategic members of the collect-
ive. To become a strategic member, a company has to 
pay a membership fee and commit resources to the de-
velopment of the platform. The Eclipse project is organ-
ized as a set of top-level projects with subprojects. 
Eclipse has a well-defined process for member engage-
ment, and project guidance is provided by three coun-
cils.  The  requirements  council  collects,  reviews,  and 
prioritizes incoming requirements. The planning coun-
cil manages the release train. The architecture council 
defines and evolves the architecture of the Eclipse plat-
form. Individual projects are overseen by project man-
agement  committees.  The  councils  are  composed  of 
strategic  members  and  representatives  of  the  project 
management committees. 
Eclipse is designed to be highly extensible. At its core is 
a  minimal  runtime  that  provides  tools  for  extension 
management.  All  functionality  of  Eclipse  (even  "core" 
functionality  such  as  basic  user  interface  elements)  is 
implemented in the form of plug-ins. Plug-ins are the 
basic  distribution  unit  of  functionality  in  Eclipse.  A 
plug-in can declare extension points, which are points 
where the behavior of the plug-in can be extended by 
others. It also implements extensions to the extension 
points of existing plug-ins. Those extension points are 
not  predefined  by  the  Eclipse  platform,  but  can  be 
defined by each plug-in author.
Findings
From  the  analysis  of  the  cases  examined  in  this  re-
search,  three  factors  were  identified  as  characteristics 
of  collectives:  level  of  contribution,  number  of  mem-
bers, and diversity of use. Level of contribution refers to 
the amount of work contributed to the core asset base 
by  a  member  of  the  collective.  Contributions  are  not 
limited to code, but can include requirements, designs, 
test  cases,  and  feedback.  The  number  of  members  is 
the size of the collective. Diversity of use measures the 
range and variety of contexts of use for the platform.
Economics of Software Product Development Collectives
Michael Weiss
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Figure 2 shows a model that links these factors to eco-
nomic  outcomes  that  we  developed  as  a  result  of  ex-
amining  the  case  studies.  Traditional  cost-benefit 
models of product lines only model the impact on cost, 
not  other  benefits  such  as  time  to  market  or  quality. 
The three economic outcomes considered in this model 
are time, quality, and cost. Time is either time to mar-
ket or the coordination overhead. Quality refers to the 
quality  of  the  core  asset  base  or  the  quality  of  the 
product. Cost is either the cost for the organization of 
the collective, the cost to create the core asset base, the 
cost to reuse assets, or the cost to create a unique asset 
not based on the platform.
The  level  of  contribution  is  not  evenly  distributed 
among members of a collective. Instead, as studies of 
open  source  projects  show,  a  small  number  of  mem-
bers account for a majority of the contributions (Crow-
ston  et  al.,  2011;  http://tinyurl.com/3nrntty).  Some 
members may be in a better position to create a specific 
core asset, because the skills required are not generally 
available,  or  they  may  have  a  more  urgent  need  than 
other members for a specific asset to be available in the 
asset  base.  Most  Eclipse  subprojects  receive  their 
primary  input  from  a  single  company.  This  company 
has greater influence over which core assets a contained 
in the platform than companies that contribute less. 
Proposition 1: Time to market decreases with the level of 
contribution as a result of better alignment between con-
tributed assets and the contributor's needs.
In the literature on small groups, trust has been noted 
as a determinant of effective team collaboration (Crow-
ston  et  al.,  2011;  http://tinyurl.com/3nrntty).  Success-
ful  leaders  make  a  strong  contribution  and  hold  a 
central position in the community. Projects run by lead-
ers  who  have  demonstrated  their  technical  skills  and 
who have a record of past successes are generally more 
likely to succeed. Trust can be increased by developing 
key functionality early in a project to demonstrate that 
the project is doable and has merit. With the initial re-
lease of the Eclipse source code in 2001, IBM triggered 
contributions from other companies.
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Figure 2. Linking factors to economic outputs. The arrows between factors and economic outcomes are the proposi-
tions that suggest causal relationships between them. The numbers on the arrow refer to the propositions. For ex-
ample, the level of contribution influences time and cost.Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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Proposition  2:  Coordination  overhead  decreases  with 
the  level  of  contribution  as  a  result  of  the  increase  in 
trust it creates between the members.
Through their level of contribution, a member can en-
sure the core assets fit with their business goals. Mem-
bers  who  contribute  the  most  to  a  specific  asset  can 
expect  to  benefit  when  reusing  the  asset.  A  study  of 
open source development found that contributors ob-
tain private benefits from the development of shared as-
sets that are not available to "free riders" who only use 
the  assets  (von  Hippel  and  von  Krogh,  2003;
http://tinyurl.com/6e39qa3).  These  include  learning, 
sense of ownership and control, and feedback from oth-
ers on the contributed code. Contributors are also in a 
better  position  to  tailor  their  code  to  their  individual 
needs, because the code that they contributed for gen-
eral  use  may  not  be  a  good  fit  with  someone  else's 
needs. Many commercial products (such as IBM's Web-
Sphere  product)  are  built  on  top  of  the  Eclipse  plat-
form. When IBM released the initial version of Eclipse, 
they had a significant lead over others in using the plat-
form even though the code was open to anyone.
Proposition 3: The cost to reuse assets in the core asset 
base and the cost to develop unique assets both decrease 
with the level of contribution.
When members of a collective contribute to a core asset 
base,  they  develop  a  shared  platform.  The  purpose  of 
the  shared  platform  is  to  provide  non-differentiating 
functionality to members of the collective so that each 
member can focus on its differentiating features. A de-
cision  on  whether  to  include  a  contribution  in  the 
shared platform is made on the basis of how well the 
contribution is aligned with the goals of the other mem-
bers of the collective. If a contribution were only to be-
nefit a single member, then it would not be included in 
the platform. For example, the Eclipse Modeling Frame-
work provides modeling and code generation capabilit-
ies  that  are  leveraged  by  tools  such  as  Rational  Rose. 
Tools  based  on  the  framework  can  interoperate  be-
cause they share common representations.
Proposition  4:  The  time  to  market  decreases  with  the 
number of members. Members can focus on the develop-
ment of value-added features. 
Each member added to a team introduces coordination 
overhead, which is time not spent productively towards 
achieving  the  task  of  the  team.  The  capacity  of  team 
members to interact with one other in meaningful ways 
is also limited. Conversely, a smaller number of collab-
orators  allows  members  to  interact  more  frequently 
with  each  other.  This  creates  stronger  ties  among  the 
members  and  increases  commitment  and  identifica-
tion with the collective and its goals. The effort to co-
ordinate  activities  can  be  controlled  by  restricting 
access, that is, strategically selecting members for spe-
cific interactions. In open source software projects, re-
stricting access to core members reduces the amount of 
coordination required when members collaborate on a 
section of the project. The Eclipse project is organized 
into top-level projects, each of which has multiple sub-
projects. Only a subset of project members is active in 
any specific subproject. 
Proposition  5:  Coordination  overhead  increases  with 
the number of members working on the same section of 
the core asset base.
A  high  level  of  quality  in  the  core  asset  base  attracts 
new members to the collective. Products built on top 
of a high quality base will also be of higher quality. In a 
collective of small companies, individual members do 
not have the resources to build a system to the level of 
quality provided by the platform. From proposition 2, 
it  is  also  apparent  that  a  collective  needs  to  receive 
enough  initial  contributions  in  order  to  reach  an  ac-
ceptable  level  of  quality  that  will  attract  more  new 
members. A study of embedded systems companies us-
ing  Linux  showed  that  these  companies  were  motiv-
ated  to  reveal  their  changes  to  Linux  to  receive 
technical support from other companies (Henkel, 2006;
http://tinyurl.com/3dbfl7v).
Proposition  6:  The  quality  of  the  core  asset  base  in-
creases with the number of members who provide feed-
back on the assets in the core asset base.
A collective approach to developing a core asset base is 
more efficient than for each member of the collective to 
develop a full software stack in isolation. Instead of cre-
ating their own versions of commodity features, mem-
bers can focus on developing features that differentiate 
them  from  each  other.  The  effort  for  maintaining  the 
software stack as it evolves is also significantly reduced. 
Changes  in  underlying  technologies  can  be  spread 
among  members.  If  members  have  existing  invest-
ments in their own software stacks, switching to a plat-
form  developed  by  a  collective  may  be  expensive  at 
first, but will pay off in the long term. Companies that 
build on the Eclipse Modeling Framework differentiate 
themselves through the value they offer to end users.
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Proposition 7: The cost of contributing to the core asset 
base decreases with the number of members who provide 
resources.
Each time the core asset base is put to use in a new con-
text,  new  aspects  of  the  base  will  be  exercised.  Each 
new  context  of  use  may  uncover  errors  or  omissions 
that had not been identified before. This increases the 
chance of correcting errors, thus increasing the quality 
of all products that depend on the asset base. For ex-
ample, each Eclipse subproject exposes the shared core 
components to new uses.
Proposition  8:  The  quality  of  the  core  asset  base  in-
creases with diversity of use. Each new context of use will 
further harden the asset base.
Diversity of use is driven by the diversity of needs of the 
members of the collective. At early stages of growth, the 
availability of multiple perspectives that come with di-
versity  of  use  benefits  a  collective.  Decisions  about 
what functionality to include in the core asset base will 
be made from a broad understanding of product needs. 
At later stages, too much diversity may, in fact, hinder 
the evolution of the core asset base in a cohesive man-
ner.  When  initially  released,  the  Eclipse  project 
provided core components for a Java-centric develop-
ment environment. It subsequently grew in diversity to 
include components for tool integration, modeling, and 
web applications that could be applied across a range 
of domains. Today, Eclipse can perhaps be best charac-
terized as a collection of vertical solutions for specific 
domains.  About  one  half  of  the  Eclipse  project  pool 
today  is  technology  specific.  The  diversity  of  Eclipse 
projects has increased significantly, and as a group, the 
projects are far less cohesive now.
Proposition  9:  The  cost  of  creating  the  core  asset  base 
first  decreases,  then  increases  with  diversity  of  use.  At 
low diversity of use, the collective benefits from a broad-
er  range  of  perspectives.  When  diversity  of  use  is  high, 
the collective will appear less cohesive.
Conclusion
The  focus  of  this  article  was  on  the  shift  in  software 
product development from single companies to collect-
ives.  The  analysis  revealed  motivations  for  companies 
to join a collective by examining the economics of col-
lectives.  The  article  also  argued  that  development  in 
collectives  effectively  amounts  to  the  creation  of  a 
shared  platform  or  product  line.  Different  from  tradi-
tional software products lines, which are managed by a 
single platform owner, these product lines are collect-
ively  owned.  Another  important  difference  is  that  the 
members of a collective are typically small and do not 
have extensive experience in product line engineering. 
In a future article we will explore the notion of a minim-
al viable product line, asking how a company can ob-
tain  some  of  the  benefits  of  a  product  line  approach 
without a full implementation of the approach.   
Even though we used the open source collective Eclipse 
as our example in this article, we have also found the 
same patterns with closed source collectives (i.e., those 
that  do  not  share  the  results  of  their  work  with  non-
members).  Closed  source  collectives  obtain  the  same 
types  of  benefits  from  collaboration  as  their  open 
source cousins. Forming a collective is not a question of 
open or closed sourcing; it is a question of development 
models.
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Managing the Challenges of Becoming
an Open Innovation Company:
Experiences from Living Labs
Mika Westerlund and Seppo Leminen
Introduction
Today’s  organizations  need  a  constant  flow  of  novel 
ideas while competing through emergent technologies. 
A growing number of companies pay close attention to 
users as a source of valuable feedback and relevant use 
experiences. Companies in all industries agree that in-
tegrating  users  in  the  innovation  process  –  to  learn 
from and with them – is crucial. Moreover, one of the 
most important recent trends is the progressive inclu-
sion of users in firms’ processes where value is co-cre-
ated,  as  described  in  the  November  2009,  December 
2009,  and  March  2011  issues  of  this  publication
(http://timreview.ca/issue-archive).  Co-creation  with 
users helps firms better address their customers’ latent 
needs.  It  reduces  market  risk  in  the  launch  of  new 
products and services, and it improves return on invest-
ment and time to market. Firms involve users in the co-
production  of  brands,  experiences,  design,  marketing 
strategies, and products or services. 
The increasingly fashionable concept of “open innova-
tion” drives user involvement. It provides an interesting 
alternative to conventional in-house development and 
includes  various  possibilities,  such  as  open  sourcing 
and  crowdsourcing.  Open  source  is  a  widespread 
means  of  innovation  in  the  software  industry,  where 
open source communities act as innovation intermedi-
aries and peer-to-peer production resources. Examples 
of  well-known  open  source  software  projects  include 
the  mainstays  of  the  LAMP  stack  (http://wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/LAMP_(software_bundle)).  As  for  crowd-
sourcing,  Google  has  been  crowdsourcing  mapping 
data, content, and ideas (http://project10tothe100.com) 
for some time now, and InnoCentive (http://wikipedia
.org/wiki/InnoCentive) crowdsources R&D for biomed-
ical and pharmaceutical companies by providing con-
nection  and  relationship  management  services 
between solution seekers and solvers. 
One particularly interesting form of open innovation is 
the living labs approach (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Living_lab), where technology is developed and tested 
in a physical or virtual real-life context, and users are 
important  informants  and  co-creators  in  the  tests 
(Kusiak,  2007;  http://tinyurl.com/5vggb7h).  The  living 
labs  approach  is  also  attractive  for  traditional  indus-
tries,  because  it  extends  the  conventional  innovation 
processes  rather  than  reinvents  them.  Companies,  on 
average, have little experience in open innovation, and 
High-technology firms have paved the way for user-driven innovations, but now even tra-
ditional industries are becoming increasingly open. This shift is a great challenge for com-
panies with instituted practices, policies, and customer relationships. In this article, we 
identify four distinct steps in becoming an open innovation company based on our recent 
research into firms’ experiences with living lab experiments in the information and com-
munication technology (ICT) sector. We describe these phases and illustrate the divergent 
roles  that  users  play  in  each  one.  We  conclude  with  a  discussion  on  the  differences 
between  the  management  challenges  of  conventional  development  projects  versus  the 
open innovation model. For all firms that wish to become open innovators, we recom-
mend that their managers promote an open organizational mindset and apply groupware 
that supports increased openness, because traditional project management tools are insuf-
ficient for open innovation. 
The  future  cannot  be  predicted,  but  futures  can  be 
invented.  It  was  man's  ability  to  invent  which  has 
made human society what it is.
Dennis Gabor
Physicist, Inventor, and Nobel Laureate (1900-1979)
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transforming from an in-house innovator into an open 
innovation  company  is  especially  difficult  for  firms  in 
traditional  industries.  Existing  academic  studies  (e.g., 
Almirall  and  Casadesus-Masanell,  2010;  http://tinyurl
.com/6je6gph) can offer only limited insight; they pre-
dominantly  consider  firm’s  innovation  development 
options  as  either  closed  or  open  without  indicating 
what is needed for a firm to become an open innovator. 
In  this  article,  we  examine  the  steps  and  managerial 
challenges firms face on their way to becoming open in-
novation companies. First, we look at customer involve-
ment in development work and discuss why some firms 
choose living labs as their preferred way to initiate it. 
Second, we describe four different steps of co-creation 
with customers and users. We use data from our recent 
research to explain how the role of users and the depth 
of their integration within firm’s innovation processes 
vary between the four steps. Third, we discuss the or-
ganizational challenges of managing co-creation, most 
of which relate to coping with change from a psycholo-
gical  perspective,  because  established  corporate  cul-
ture and practices often hinder this type of change. We 
argue that the managerial tools required in open innov-
ation  differ  from  those  used  in  conventional,  project-
based innovation development.
Customer Involvement in Development 
Work 
Many companies no longer attempt to grasp the details 
of customer needs and use experiences. They reassign 
the  design  aspect  of  product  development  to  external 
sources of ideas, such as their customers, who can help 
with  innovation  work  and  create  value  (Edvarsson  et 
al.,  2010;  http://tinyurl.com/3exkqua).  Seeking  to  un-
derstand user needs is expensive and labour intensive, 
but customer insight speeds up the development pro-
cesses of products and services and lowers the cost. Za-
ltmann (2003; http://tinyurl.com/4xmrtba) argues that 
firms  increasingly  recognize  the  need  for  integrating 
users  as  co-developers  in  R&D  activities,  because  at 
least 80% of new products and services fail once they 
are  launched  into  the  market.  With  co-development, 
the result is more innovative and better fits with market 
needs.
The most common means of integrating users into de-
velopment work involves collecting feedback on a com-
pany’s products and services. However, users are now 
so  intimately  involved  in  the  development  processes 
that they have become co-creators of value and the in-
novation is user-driven. To co-create value, the firm, its 
customers, and its partners must reconcile their object-
ives,  define  the  role  and  effort  required  from  each 
party, and agree on an equitable division of the returns 
(Chesbrough, 2003; http://tinyurl.com/455m3q6). Shift-
ing  the  focus  from  ownership  to  openness  requires  a 
total  reconsideration  of  the  processes  that  underlie 
value  creation  and  capture  (Chesbrough  and  Apple-
yard, 2007; http://tinyurl.com/3ne6xts). 
Customer involvement in innovation development also 
has challenges. Experiments show that ideas from users 
are often more original and valuable, but ideas from in-
house developers are more realizable (Edvarsson et al., 
2010;  http://tinyurl.com/3exkqua).  Therefore,  man-
agers  need  to  consider  the  type  and  organization  of 
R&D to be performed, including a choice about the ex-
posure of the innovation work to knowledge from out-
side  the  firm.  Open  innovation  calls  for  a  specific 
organizational  mindset,  which  requires  the  creation 
and  learning  of  a  new  operational  culture,  including 
open  organization,  processes,  and  products  and  ser-
vices. Openness is difficult for firms where convention-
al thinking is the norm, because it means the firm must 
consider the inputs of others and cannot exert exclusive 
rights over the resultant innovation. 
The Living Lab as a Form of Open Innovation
A firm can become an open innovator in different ways. 
Living  labs  provide  an  option  for  firms  in  industries, 
where  the  cognitive  distinction  between  closed  and 
open  innovation  is  particularly  strong.  Living  labs  are 
co-creation  ecosystems  for  human-centric  research 
and innovation. We share the view of Ballon and col-
leagues (2005; http://tinyurl.com/5wwollx), who define 
living  labs  as  experimentation  environments;  they  are 
physical regions or virtual realities where stakeholders 
form public-private-people partnerships (4Ps) of firms, 
public  agencies,  universities,  institutes,  and  users  all 
collaborating for creation, prototyping, validating, and 
testing of new technologies, services, products and sys-
tems in real-life contexts. Living labs are different from 
test  beds  for  controlled  testing  of  a  technology  in  a 
laboratory environment and field trials for testing in a 
limited, but still real-life, environment. 
Stewart (2007; http://tinyurl.com/6cx2pfb) makes a dis-
tinction between diverse types of living labs. They in-
clude:  i)  narrow  but  sizable  communities  of  expert 
users; ii) whole bounded populations; iii) living labs for 
technical  service  development;  and  iv)  living  labs  for Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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non-technical  research  using  a  service  platform.  All 
these  types  have  something  in  common:  they  employ 
an array of participants with different rationale for join-
ing the innovation development. Participants must re-
concile  their  objectives  and  define  both  the  role  and 
effort required from each party and an equitable divi-
sion of the returns to co-create value. Many living labs 
also join regional or global networks of living labs, such 
as the geographically distributed European Network of 
Living Labs (http://www.openlivinglabs.eu). 
A living lab provides a concrete setting, unlike the other 
forms  of  open  and  collaborative  innovation  (Schaffers 
et al., 2007; http://tinyurl.com/6x8y6ku). Its main activ-
ities are: 
1. Co-creation: co-design by users and producers; util-
izers and enablers are also involved. 
2.  Exploration:  discovering  emerging  usages,  beha-
viours, and market opportunities. 
3. Experimentation: implementing live scenarios with-
in communities of users. 
4.  Evaluation:  assessment  of  concepts,  products,  and 
services according to socio-ergonomic, socio-cognitive, 
and socio-economic criteria.
Living labs are platforms that bring together all the rel-
evant parties for innovation co-creation. They open up 
the  possibility  to  generate  a  wide  and  extensive  spec-
trum of product and service portfolios (De Ryuter et al., 
2007; http://tinyurl.com/3ugxd54) and connect produ-
cers and users with utilizers and enablers. The utilizer is 
a non-producer firm that seeks efficiency gains, supple-
ments to resource bottlenecks, and knowledge from the 
living lab. It may boost its innovation process through 
the living lab network or even outsource its innovation 
capacity and knowledge to boost the living lab network. 
Enablers  are  companies  or  organizations  that  provide 
supportive  technology,  virtual  or  physical  space,  and 
other necessary resources to the use of participants.
Data Collection and Analysis
Between 2007 and 2010, we conducted 27 semi-struc-
tured interviews with senior managers of ICT compan-
ies.  The  data  includes  companies  of  all  sizes  from 
startups to large multinationals. We chose the ICT in-
dustry because open innovation practices are most ad-
vanced  in  high-technology  industries  (Chiaroni  et  al., 
2011;  http://tinyurl.com/3h4pdav).  Therefore,  we  ex-
pected to find many firms that integrate users in their 
R&D processes or provide such services to other firms. 
Most of the firms we studied followed closed, producer-
led development practices, while some were more open 
and  user  driven.  Because  all  our  case  companies  em-
ploy or intend to use living labs to boost their business, 
we expected that our interviewees could provide useful 
information on the past or current challenges of open-
ing up a firm’s innovation development. To further un-
derstand living labs as a form of open innovation, and 
the  challenges  of  operating  with  multiple  parties  who 
have different motives, we conducted an additional 40 
interviews  with  the  staff  of  living  labs  in  Finland, 
Sweden, and Spain. 
We analyzed the data in a way similar to Lazzarotti and 
Manzini (2009; http://tinyurl.com/3zk9zbo), who estab-
lished a framework to describe four basic ways to col-
laborate. Although the two dimensions along which we 
analyzed  our  data  –  the  degree  of  openness  and  the 
type of co-creation – are different from their study, we 
also ended up with four different steps of collaboration. 
The following sections describe these four steps. 
Four Steps to Becoming an Open Innovator
According  to  our  analysis,  when  a  conventional  in-
house  developer  decides  to  become  an  open  innova-
tion company, they will likely encounter four steps of 
development:  i)  producer-driven;  ii)  user-centric 
closed; iii) user-centric open; and iv) user-driven, as il-
lustrated in Figure 1. These steps represent increasing 
degrees of user involvement. Firms are not required to 
progress  through  these  steps  sequentially,  although 
that is the usual pattern. Furthermore, a firm can start 
or stop at any step. Previous research shows that it may 
take a long time for a firm to become an open innovator 
and  this  change  may  bring  about  many  challenges 
(Chiaroni  et  al.,  2011;  http://tinyurl.com/3h4pdav). 
Managers  need  to  establish  a  new  organizational  cul-
ture and mindset to support opening up their innova-
tion processes. 
Step 1: Producer-driven. In the first step, development 
work is led by the producer and is closed. This step is 
characterized by technology push, since the innovation 
originates from the producer’s ideas and patents. The 
firm’s  policy  to  maintain  knowledge  and  intellectual 
property rights within the company guides the develop-
ment work. The staff has little communication or inter-
action  with  users;  it  considers  them  merely  as  buyers Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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whose  role  is  to  purchase  and  consume  the  firm’s 
products and services. The contacts in customer firms 
are not the actual users of the product or service. Users’ 
knowledge and use experiences, as well as potential de-
velopment ideas, fail to flow into the producer organiza-
tion  due  to  minimal  interaction  with  customers. 
Because of the restrictive producer-driven culture, the 
same may apply even if the company collects feedback 
by  conducting  market  research,  customer  surveys,  or 
interviews  with  the  customers,  because  the  firm  may 
not  apply  this  information  to  its  development  work. 
This lack of relevant information in development work 
is  somewhat  paradoxical,  as  even  producer-driven  in-
novators  recognize  the  value  and  benefits  of  under-
standing users. 
Companies operating in the producer-driven step often 
use  intermediaries  such  as  consultants  to  obtain  cus-
tomer feedback and development ideas. Because com-
panies’  co-creation  with  users  is  almost  non-existent, 
intermediaries  act  as  agents  between  the  developer 
firm and the users. Agents collect users’ needs and use 
experiences,  then  disseminate  them  to  the  producer’s 
R&D department. Our data suggests that the reason for 
using  agents  is  their  ease  of  use  from  the  producer’s 
perspective. In addition, companies lack the skills, ex-
perience,  or  resources  required  to  interact  with  their 
customers  in  a  way  that  would  benefit  the  parties  in-
volved. 
Step 2: User-centric closed. In the second step, devel-
opment work is still led by the producer and is closed, 
but  the  role  of  users  is  more  visible  than  in  the  first 
step. The producer and its partners collect ideas from 
users  through  customer  surveys  and  user  studies, 
which  often  take  place  in  the  company’s  premises. 
These studies are quite comprehensive and systematic-
ally  target  specific  users.  Some  users  are  involved  in 
early stages of the development process, whereas oth-
ers are included in later stages. Producers use pilot test-
ing for new products and services; pilot users include 
customers as well as the firm’s employees, family mem-
bers, and employees of the firm’s partners. 
Some  business  units  within  the  company  have  ample 
resources  and  experience  of  user  involvement  while 
others have none. R&D management does not have es-
tablished general procedures for user involvement, and 
organizational culture fails to support openness in the 
innovation process. Therefore, the producer expends a 
lot  of  effort  protecting  its  intellectual  property  rights 
and maintaining knowledge and information strictly in-
side  the  organization.  User  involvement  is  not  the 
firm’s primary objective and it does not have related or-
ganization-wide practices.
Step 3: User-centric open. In the third step, develop-
ment work is somewhat led by customers, but they are 
disposable  in  the  sense  that  a  given  individual  is  in-
Figure 1. Four steps to becoming an open innovation companyTechnology Innovation Management Review October 2011
23 www.timreview.ca
Managing the Challenges of Becoming an Open Innovation Company
Mika Westerlund and Seppo Leminen
volved  in  the  process  only  once.  This  step  is  a  major 
move towards the open innovation model in terms of 
increased  openness.  Companies  consider  users,  who 
are both the firm’s current and potential clientele, as an 
important  source  of  information.  Relevant  procedures 
required  for  user  involvement  are  widespread  within 
the  producer  organization  and  user  involvement  is 
among the firm’s daily routines. Characteristically, the 
producer understands the value of its users’ knowledge 
and its previous experiences of value co-creation with 
customers and users are mainly positive.
Nevertheless, the company only involves users in some 
phases of the innovation process. It selects them pur-
posely for a certain phase on the basis of its needs; the 
same users do not participate throughout the product 
or service innovation lifecycle. The chosen users will be 
excluded from the subsequent phases after it is accom-
plished,  because  they  quickly  learn  how  to  use  the 
newly-developed service or process. Learning discour-
ages them giving critical feedback and suggestions for 
further  improvements.  Therefore,  finding  more  and 
more new pilot users becomes a challenge for the com-
pany. 
Step  4:  User-driven.  In  the  fourth  step,  development 
work  is  led  by  customers  and  is  open.  In  this  step,  a 
company  enters  into  intense,  long-term  collaboration 
with its users and the majority of the firm’s innovation 
activity is grounded on user involvement. Users’ latent 
needs and motives for collaboration in innovation devel-
opment rise up and become explicable through their ef-
forts. The firm has well-established procedures for user 
involvement,  and  value  co-creation  with  its  current  or 
potential customers takes place across the organization. 
The  company’s  innovation  development  practices 
evolve  rapidly.  Value  co-creation  is  achieved  through 
continuous trial and error, leading to new products and 
services,  concepts,  or  operational  improvements.  The 
producer often tries new ways of operating and if the 
new  methods  do  not  yield  improvements,  it  tries 
something else. User-driven development work is truly 
challenging, because the company entirely opens up its 
processes and procedures. Organized innovation devel-
opment activities – which targeted specific users in the 
previous steps – are now open to any interested parties. 
Still, operation remains largely unorganized for an un-
disclosed time; it amends and adapts in time by the in-
terests of the participants.
Managing Increased Openness
In this section, we describe the management challenges 
that  firms  face  in  opening  up  their  development  pro-
cesses  during  their  transition  from  conventional,  pro-
ject-based development to open innovation. 
Conventional  R&D  is  grounded  in  projects  that  bring 
about new products and services, beneficial change, or 
added value. Meredith and Mantel (1995; http://tinyurl
.com/5v34qld)  point  out  that  a  project  targets  a  well-
defined set of desired end results and a single project it-
self  is  non-recurrent.  A  project  is  a  temporary  en-
deavor, having a defined beginning and end, and it is 
undertaken  to  meet  unique  goals  and  objectives.  The 
fundaments  of  project  management  are  based  on  at-
taining  preset  end  results  and  management  reaches 
these goals by using diverse project management tools, 
methods,  and  models  (Eskerod  and  Riis,  2009;
http://tinyurl.com/5v9t9kx).  Companies  can  decrease 
perceived uncertainty by running projects through se-
quential design phases or subprojects, as in the water-
fall model (http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Waterfall_model).
Möller  and  colleagues  (2008;  http://tinyurl.com/
3s95gax) show that innovation co-creation can be pro-
ducer-driven,  customer-driven,  or  in  equilibrium. 
When employing the open innovation model, user in-
put  steers  the  direction  of  innovation  creation  pro-
cesses  heavily  (Chesbrough,  2003;  http://tinyurl.com/
455m3q6).  Open  innovation  is  based  on  value  co-cre-
ation with users and the end result of the development 
work  is  unforeseeable  beforehand,  unlike  in  conven-
tional  development  projects.  Traditional  project  man-
agement methods, where fundamental assumptions of 
the management are based on a clear measurable goal 
of  a  project  (Maylor  et  al.,  2008;  http://tinyurl.com/
3ep6os3), fail to apply in the open innovation model. 
Hacievliyagil  and  Auger  (2010;  http://tinyurl.com/
667h9o2) stress the impact of open innovation on the 
management  of  R&D.  Our  data  on  living  labs  shows 
that  conventional  project-based  innovation  develop-
ment and the open innovation model differ in many re-
spects.  These  differences  are  highly  relevant  for  the 
firm’s management in its attempt to become an open 
innovation  company.  Management  needs  to  pay  spe-
cial attention to these differences in order to stress the 
right aspects during the transformation. The main dif-
ferences include:Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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1.  Objective.  Traditional  innovation  projects  aim  at 
firmly  pre-defined  goals.  Managers  can  evaluate  the 
success  of  the  project  by  comparing  the  realized  out-
comes with the original project plan. Our data indicates 
that the open innovation model is different. Living labs 
target undefined objectives, albeit they introduce loose 
guidelines  to  initiate  and  promote  collaboration.  The 
objectives can change many times, as they depend on 
the interaction and collaboration among participants of 
the living lab. The results may comprise several differ-
ent  outcomes,  which  were  not  targeted  in  the  begin-
ning  of  the  development  work.  The  purpose  of 
collaboration  is  producing  products  and  services  or 
solutions that have better market fit. 
2.  Control  points.  Conventional  projects  apply  preset 
control  points  for  amendments.  Project  management 
control points are usually located at the completion of 
defined  tasks  within  the  overall  project  plan.  Because 
this plan describes the tasks, it heavily limits and guides 
the timing of changes in the goals and tasks or even the 
termination  of  project.  Open  innovation  allows  for 
changes  to  be  made  any  time  during  the  co-develop-
ment work. For example, a living lab has few strictly set 
control points; it is self-organizing and the goals of in-
novation development change by the users’ activity and 
involvement. 
3. Project manager’s role. The project manager’s role 
differs clearly between conventional projects and open 
innovation.  In  the  conventional  model,  the  project 
manager  manages  and  controls  the  resources  and  or-
ganizes schedules according to the project plan. Parti-
cipants  of  a  living  lab  cannot  be  managed  as  though 
they  are  personnel,  because  users  join  the  innovation 
co-creation work on a voluntary basis. Their participa-
tion is often compelled by hedonic motives instead of 
economic ones. For example, many users do not expect 
any  monetary  rewards  because  they  value  the  oppor-
tunity to participate and learn about the development 
process.  Often, users consider that a token gift or form-
al recognition of their efforts is sufficient reward. Man-
agers  need  to  learn  how  to  motivate  users  and  other 
participants in living labs, which is challenging and re-
source intensive. 
4. User’s role. A conventional innovation development 
project deems users as objects of study. They join the 
project in diverse roles at any time during the product 
development  lifecycle,  whether  the  project  is  an  early 
trend-identification  phase  or  about  to  launch.  Some-
times, end users test and verify products and services 
even  after  the  launch.  Open  innovation  is  different; 
users  are  equal  to  other  participants  in  living  labs,  as 
they are genuine co-creators of value. They participate 
in various intensive analyses concerning their everyday 
life, as well as in planning and doing the innovation de-
velopment work.
5.  Resources.  Innovation  resources  in  traditional  pro-
jects  include  those  of  the  firm  and  its  partners,  and 
companies spend these resources on many activities re-
lating to a project plan. While projects emphasize the 
capability  to  utilize  extant  resources  timely  and  effi-
ciently, a living lab requires new resources and capabil-
ities  that  are  obtained  or  created  by  integrating  the 
participants’ knowledge. Because the goals change rad-
ically over time, co-creation in open innovation may ne-
cessitate  resources  that  were  not  anticipated  in  the 
beginning. User involvement is resource intensive and 
a  key  managerial  challenge  is  to  facilitate  user  com-
munities to generate sufficient support and resources. 
6.  Management  tools.  When  managing  conventional 
projects,  companies  can  choose  from  a  large  assort-
ment  of  extant  methods  and  tools,  such  as  the  stage-
gate model (http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Stage-gate_model) 
or project management software like Microsoft Project, 
which help managers control and monitor the progress 
of  a  project  efficiently.  Open  innovation  communities 
make collective decisions about future directions, and 
control  and  coordination  is  usually  self-organized. 
Therefore, companies running or participating in run-
ning living labs need to use diverse facilitative methods, 
work group tools, and relevant groupware. 
Conclusion
This article investigates co-creation of innovations with 
users.  We  examined  the  challenges  firms  face  when 
they transform from conventional in-house developers 
to open innovation companies. A living lab is a real-life 
test and experimentation environment where users and 
producers co-create innovations. With data from small 
and large high-tech firms using the living lab approach, 
we found four distinctive steps in becoming an open in-
novator.
We argue that, although a firm can start or stop at any 
step, the path from closed to open modes of innovation 
evolves  step  by  step  for  pragmatic  reasons.  It  spreads 
out the degree of change in culture and practices, be-
cause the transformation is challenging and takes time 
and effort. Companies must first de-learn their current Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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practices and possibly seek new customer domains that 
differ from their current market. For small companies, 
the change towards an open innovator is easier than for 
large firms, as they are often more agile and less restric-
ted by current markets and practices due to their small-
ness and newness. 
However, the main challenges for any company include 
establishing a new organizational culture and mindset 
as  well  as  providing  facilities  that  support  increased 
openness. Traditional project management tools are in-
sufficient for the purpose. Therefore, managers of com-
panies  in  any  industry  that  intend  to  become  open 
innovators should apply groupware tools that facilitate 
and motivate all participants of innovation co-creation. 
Companies  that  already  use  agile  development  meth-
ods probably adapt to open modes of innovation quick-
er than those relying on plan-driven methods, because 
they have more adaptive and responsive organizational 
culture.Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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Acquisition Integration Models: How Large
Companies Successfully Integrate Startups
Peter Carbone
Introduction
When large companies wish to bring new technology to 
market,  increase  their  portfolio  capability  to  address 
broader customer opportunities, or access new custom-
ers  or  market  segments,  their  need  to  move  quickly 
drives  them  to  consider  acquiring  the  assets  of  other 
companies.  The  target  of  acquisition,  typically  a  star-
tup,  may  have  outstanding  technology  and  a  wish  to 
exit stand-alone operation in favour of being acquired. 
Their motivation may be to leverage a larger company’s 
capabilities,  such  as  cash  for  growth,  access  to  chan-
nels, and brand association. The combination of these 
complementary  motivations  may  seem  to  provide  a 
strong force in the market, however, a strong commer-
cial outcome depends on successful integration to real-
ize  the  consolidated  potential  of  any  deal.    Many 
acquisitions that looked promising during the business 
case phase do not deliver to expectation, in part due to 
the implementation challenges.
Based on a several first-hand acquisition experiences, I 
have observed that the majority of the discussion pre-
ceding the close of a deal is often focused on the value 
of the technology being acquired, the fit to a customer’s 
solution,  sales  projections,  market  valuation,  and  po-
tential roles for the senior leaders in the acquiring com-
pany. The most successful transactions that I have been 
involved with also had a clear strategy for the assimila-
tion of the new company into the acquired company, 
one that fueled growth of the strongest assets.
Transactions Selected for Examination
Over an eight year period, Nortel (http://wikipedia.org
/wiki/Nortel) made more than 20 acquisitions of com-
panies to improve its market/competitive position and 
accelerate  technology  availability.  This  article  will  ex-
amine  six  of  these  transactions  (Table  1),  selected 
based on the author’s personal involvement. These se-
lected transactions illustrate some of the characteristics 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been popular means for many companies to ad-
dress the increasing pace and level of competition that they face. Large companies have 
pursued acquisitions to more quickly access technology, markets, and customers, and this 
approach has always been a viable exit strategy for startups. However, not all deals deliver 
the anticipated benefits, in large part due to poor integration of the acquired assets into 
the acquiring company. Integration can greatly impact the success of the acquisition and, 
indeed, the combined company’s overall market success. 
In this article, I explore the implementation of several integration models that have been 
put  into  place  by  a  large  company  and  extract  principles  that  may  assist  negotiating 
parties with maximizing success. This perspective may also be of interest to smaller com-
panies as they explore exit options while trying to ensure continued market success after 
acquisition. I assert that business success with acquisitions is dependent on an appropri-
ate integration model, but that asset integration is not formulaic. Any integration effort 
must consider the specific market context and personnel involved.
In all affairs it's a healthy thing now and then to hang a 
question  mark  on  the  things  you  have  long  taken  for 
granted.             
Bertrand Russell
Author, Mathematician, and Philosopher (1872-1970)
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of the different integration models being used and will 
be examined based on their impact on performance.
Models of Integration
Different models of integration are characterized based 
on how the newly acquired assets are leveraged by the 
acquirer.  Figure  1  illustrates  four  types  of  integration 
that can be differentiated along two dimensions: i) the 
form of integration used and ii) the target organization 
for  integration.  The  form  of  integration  considers 
whether  resources  are  consolidated  in  the  buyer’s  or 
seller’s company; the other dimension considers wheth-
er the combined entity remains as a standalone unit or 
is absorbed into the acquiring company’s units. 
1. The “Cross-Leverage” model leaves the acquisition as 
a  separate  business  unit,  but  merges  the  technology 
and people into the main company. Bay Networks was 
a large company and, after being acquired, was folded 
into the existing data business within Nortel at the exec-
utive level. It then underwent portfolio rationalization 
and integration across the new, larger data networking 
unit, being fully assimilated over time. This is the de-
fault model when the acquired company is very large or 
has overlapping portfolio elements that must be ration-
alized.
2.  The  “New  Bet”  model  turns  an  acquisition  into  a 
new, standalone business unit within the company to 
pursue  a  new  market  segment.  Shasta  was  a  startup 
that had a unique value proposition at the time. They 
offered a services gateway based on routing technology 
that  was  not  easily  addressable  by  the  market  leader, 
Cisco,  due  to  its  architecture.  Shasta  was  set  up  as  a 
new,  standalone  “applications  business  unit”  within 
the  larger  company  and  was  chartered  to  lead  in  this 
new  applications  space  by  leveraging  Nortel’s  brand, 
customer base, and manufacturing leverage. In theory, 
this model should assist in entering a new market seg-
ment;  however  the  new  entity  must  overcome  many 
challenges,  such  as  the  acquiring  company’s  lack  of 
brand  value  in  a  new  space,  different  business  pro-
cesses, and unwanted ”help” from the acquiring com-
pany.
3. The “Top Up” model breaks up the acquired entity in-
to  portfolio  elements  and  consolidates  it  into  the  ac-
quiring  company.  Architel’s  portfolio  elements  were 
consolidated with the Nortel portfolio elements and the 
product  managers  and  technology  people  moved  to 
join Nortel organizations. Clarify was split between the 
Enterprise and Service Provider divisions within Nortel 
and  was  consolidated  within  these  units.  This  model 
works well to accelerate a successful internal business 
Table 1. Summary of selected Nortel acquisitionsTechnology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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unit by providing it with additional resources and filling 
gaps more quickly than can be done organically.
4. The “Double Down” model consolidates both com-
panies’ assets into the acquired company. In the case of 
Aptis, all Nortel and Bay Networks remote access tech-
nology and associated sales teams were moved to Aptis 
and the President of Aptis took on the larger responsib-
ility  for  the  development  and  revenue  targets  of  the 
combined  portfolio.  This  model  works  best  when  the 
acquired company has the market momentum, brand, 
customer base, or channel, and when it also has an ef-
fective leadership team.
The motivation for using one model over another ap-
pears to consider the following:
1. The acquiring executive’s preference for structuring 
and organizing the new assets, often based on the avail-
able internal talent
2. What is possible giving the size of the acquisition
3. The decision to focus on business results (e.g., mar-
ket  share,  revenue)  or  technology  results  (e.g.,  plat-
forms, portfolio elements)
Each  of  these  four  models  had  some  strengths  and 
weaknesses,  as  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  sec-
tion.
Implementation Discussion
The most successful transactions, as measured by mar-
ket or revenue growth, were the ones that maintained a 
strong business focus after the deal closed, rather than 
a  strong  technology  focus.  By  reviewing  these  six  ex-
amples,  the  key  attributes  that  contributed  to  success 
or failure can be distilled.
Aptis grew to become the market share leader in its cat-
egory, despite competition from large, dominant play-
ers,  such  as  Cisco  and  Alcatel.    Aptis  had  developed 
high-performance  technology,  but  were  struggling  to 
penetrate  the  market.  The  following  factors  impacted 
their success:
1. Consolidation of smaller capacity remote access plat-
forms with Aptis and provision of a clear and single fo-
cus for remote access in the company. This avoided the 
inevitable  platform  battles  that  would  have  emerged 
between  different  organizations  if  they  had  not  been 
consolidated.
2.  Consolidation  of  associated  sales  forces.  This 
provided access to large customers (Regional Bell Oper-
ating Companies in this case) and avoided go-to-mar-
ket conflict.
3.  Setting  of  aggressive  revenue  targets  (beyond  what 
Aptis  thought  possible).  This  was  a  clear  and  shared 
goal for the entire team and made the Aptis unit a core 
contributor to the success of the overall Nortel division.
4. Transfer of an experienced R&D leader to Aptis, who 
was able to tap the Nortel technology portfolio quickly 
for required assets and manufacturing capability. This 
person worked well as an “employee” of the Aptis, suc-
cessfully eliminating an “us versus them” mindset.
5.  Appointment  of  the  President  of  Aptis  as  the  clear 
leader for the consolidated business.
6. Provision of required investment to develop and ship 
the competitive product.
With limited distractions and a clear focus, this became 
one  of  Nortel’s  most  successful  transactions  in  that  it 
exceeded its acquisition business case.
Cambrian  grew  to  provide  a  successful  platform  and 
portfolio for Nortel, and it held a market leadership pos-
Figure 1. Four models of acquisition integrationTechnology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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ition for several years. The company had developed and 
delivered  a  technology  capability  in  advance  of  most 
competitors  and  were  struggling  with  scaling  to  de-
mand.  Following  its  acquisition  by  Nortel,  Cambrian 
was provided with:
1. A senior Nortel leader to co-lead the business unit. 
The Nortel leader provided access to R&D and manu-
facturing,  as  well  as  the  service  provider  market.  The 
Cambrian  leadership  remained  focused  on  enterprise 
opportunities, and by working well together, they were 
able to reach a leadership position.
2.  Clarity  around  Cambrian’s  positioned  as  the  com-
pany’s  key  bet  in  the  metro-optical  space,  including 
ambitious  targets  that  were  key  to  the  success  of  the 
overall business unit.
3. Investment to grow and evolve the portfolio and plat-
form.
4.  Access  to  Nortel’s  technology  and  manufacturing 
capability.
5. Access to Nortel’s customer base and sales team.
Cambrian was also a successful transaction. As with the 
Aptis acquisition, the decision made was to add capabil-
ity and fuel to the unit that was focused and was gain-
ing  success.  By  doing  this,  Nortel  avoided  having  to 
train  a  new  leadership  team  and  address  the  natural 
concerns  that  acquired  companies  have  about  being 
“taken over”. The key was to rapidly fuel a winning busi-
ness and provide it with a compatible joint leadership 
team.
The “new bet” on Shasta was less successful. Although 
they had excellent technology and market position for 
their target service-edge market, the startup leadership 
team  did  not  know  how  to  leverage  Nortel  effectively 
and had little respect for the Nortel team, seeing the lar-
ger  company  as  a  drag  on  their  nimbleness  and  mo-
mentum. Table 2 summarizes the factors that impacted 
the success of this acquisition.
The  “top  up”  of  the  network  management  portfolio 
with  Architel  worked  as  expected.  The  Architel  team 
saw  the  value  in  leveraging  Nortel’s  technology  and 
sales to further penetrate the market, and this contrib-
uted to the new unit’s aligned objectives. These efforts 
benefited greatly from a compatible management team 
at the director level. The service provider portion of Cla-
rify  was  less  successful  because  the  core  technology 
team was retained in a different unit that had different 
priorities.  This  arrangement  slowed  the  implementa-
tion changes required to fit the offers to the respective 
markets. Because the Clarify team was artificially split 
between  Nortel  units,  they  retained  allegiance  to  two 
masters  (their  old  core  team  and  their  new  masters: 
Nortel), which negatively impacted performance.
The Cross-Leverage model used with Bay Networks was 
difficult to implement due to the relative large sizes of 
the two merging organizations and the overall complex-
Table 2. Factors that impacted the success of the Shasta acquisition by Nortel Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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ity of the portfolio and market. Time was not an ally, as 
competitors  were  able  to  target  various  portfolio  ele-
ments  and  reduce  overall  penetration.  This  put  pres-
sure  on  development  budgets,  ultimately  resulting  in 
program cancellations. There was drift in focus due to 
the multitude of potential opportunities, and the integ-
ration  into  the  Nortel  unit  required  the  two  teams  to 
spend  time  educating  each  other  on  capabilities  and 
strategies. The slow integration prevented this acquisi-
tion from performing to its potential. 
Increasing the Potential for Success
The question is always how to maximize the probability 
of success with any M&A activity. Based on experience 
with  these  transactions,  there  are  five  key  principles 
that, if followed, would increase the probability of any 
acquisition success. Many of these can be derived with 
common sense, however, based on the variable success 
in  the  transactions  examined  here,  more  attention 
should be paid to them.
1.  Maintain  a  business  focus  over  the  business  case 
period used to justify the transaction. In several cases, 
the original business case used to justify the acquisition 
was  overlooked  due  to  changes  in  leadership,  market 
conditions,  or  perceived  momentum.  This  can  be 
avoided by having the transaction’s sponsoring execut-
ive continue to be actively involved and accountable to 
deliver the original business plan (or justify its enhance-
ment), at least until it can be determined that the mar-
ket momentum promised is on track for delivery. 
2. Accommodate the size of the acquisition in the in-
tegration plan, with a focus on ensuring the business 
plan  is  implemented  quickly.  Small  acquisitions  pro-
ceed  more  quickly  into  integration  than  larger  ones, 
thereby  enhancing  the  performance  of  the  business 
plan. For large acquisitions, the company must hasten 
any “cross-leveraging” integration to reduce the vulner-
ability of the new entity to competition. From the ex-
amples above, this goal can be accomplished by rapidly 
assimilating  the  portfolio  elements  and  associated 
people into the unit. 
3. Ensure compatibility at the level of working-team 
management,  not  just  the  executive  level.  Executives 
of the acquired company are always a focus in a trans-
action, however, in some of the transactions examined 
here, some of the key management people were moved 
into organizations with little consideration for their fit. 
This results in friction, delays, and unproductive polit-
ics.  This  potential  problem  was  addressed  in  other 
transactions by assessing the compatibility of the work-
ing-level  team  leaders  and  accommodating  their  re-
quirements  for  success  (e.g.,  clearly  delineated 
responsibilities, joint performance objectives).
4. Bet on the team that has momentum in the market. 
It seems obvious, however, it is easy for a master-slave 
relationship develop. To avoid this potential problem, 
the business case should reflect the resulting organiza-
tional model and associated performance so that “fuel” 
can be quickly added” to the asset that has momentum. 
5.  Ensure  absolute  clarity  around  the  new  purpose, 
mission, and business objectives of the acquisition. As 
is often the case, a transaction changes the scope, mar-
ket access, or potential for the new combined unit. Of-
ten, the acquired company wants to continue with the 
status quo because this approach helped them achieve 
a success exit. Alternatively, the buyer may want to fold 
the  assets  into  its  current  model.  As  in  the  cases  ex-
amined above, the most successful integrations estab-
lish clear leadership and business objectives, and they 
provide the new leader with the appropriate tools to do 
the job.
Although selecting a model is not formulaic, in addition 
to  putting  appropriate  business  discipline  around  the 
transaction, betting on the team with momentum has a 
high impact. This involves consolidating with the new 
player  (as  seen  with  Aptis)  or  strengthening  internal 
momentum  (as  seen  in  the  Architel  network  manage-
ment case). The team that best knows how to use the as-
sets will have higher potential for market leadership. 
In hindsight, the Shasta acquisition might have resulted 
in  better  performance  had  principle  5  been  applied 
along with the Double Down model, thereby consolid-
ating  the  smaller  capacity  VPN  portfolio  with  the  ac-
quired company. 
Conclusion 
The requirement for choosing an appropriate integra-
tion model is not a surprise, but too often it is pushed 
aside  during  the  excitement  of  the  chase.  Although 
M&A is a key tool for driving competitiveness, addition-
al focus must be placed on integrating the assets of the 
companies  to  realize  the  anticipated  value.  As  with 
most  processes,  success  is  based  on  people  and  the Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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speed  of  execution.  Success  is  easier  to  achieve  with 
small  acquisitions,  but  there  is  no  reliable,  formulaic 
model.
The five principles identified here, by looking at a sub-
set of Nortel’s acquisitions, highlight the application of 
common business principles to the M&A space, includ-
ing measuring results against a plan, making decisions 
quickly,  clarifying  purpose,  supporting  a  winner,  and 
ensuring strong team performance.
Understanding the characteristics of these different in-
tegration models and their success factors may allow a 
small company to promote its value and integration dif-
ferently and avoid traps that can destroy the value of an 
acquisition. An acquisition is a material change, and it 
requires change in management structure, which is al-
ways  difficult  and  bring  with  it  potential  benefit  and 
risk.  Principle  4  –  betting  on  the  team  that  has  mo-
mentum in the market - is often the hardest for a com-
pany  to  do;  however,  allowing  new  players  that  have 
market momentum to drive the business is a founda-
tion of any successful acquisition.Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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Introduction
Entrepreneurs  are  exposed  to  a  wide  range  of  assist-
ance and mentorship. Much of this help is focused on 
solution development and product-level commercializ-
ation. Both are important and are rightly fundamental 
to future investment decisions on the part of angels and 
venture  capital  companies.  These  two  areas  do  not, 
however, offer a complete picture of sustainable entre-
preneurial success. 
Typically, startup organizations will “take a product to 
market” focusing on the technology with no attention 
paid to the actual execution of sales. Therefore, tradi-
tional product commercialization efforts often amount 
to little more than a “build it and they will come” ap-
proach  to  growth,  which  is  about  as  effective  as  one 
would expect. Consequently, many companies are only 
modestly  successful  in  their  early  growth  efforts  and 
seek structured external funding before fully exploring 
the opportunities afforded by their selling model.
Entrepreneurs are failing to achieve strong early growth 
despite  the  valuable  and  well-intentioned  help  that  is 
available to them. Sales execution is under-emphasized 
by assistance programs and mentors, and yet value dis-
covery,  analysis,  and  creation,  together  with  efficient 
customer  engagement,  are  fundamental  to  entrepren-
eurial success. In this article, we suggest that startups 
are often not made aware of an additional critical ele-
ment: a sales execution strategy.
Consider a typical entrepreneur: they know everything 
about the company’s products and technology, but are 
unable tell sales strategy from sales execution strategy. 
The  difference  between  the  two  is  unclear  for  many. 
Strategy is what to do; execution is how to do it. 
A sales execution strategy is a working document that 
contains a clearly defined set of goals, targets, and sales 
collateral  that,  if  correctly  implemented,  will  allow  a 
startup to significantly scale sales.  The sales execution 
strategy,  implemented  along  the  appropriate  sales 
vehicle,  will  enable  rapid  and  high-probably  engage-
ment with the target market while minimizing the cost 
of  sales.  In  this  article,  we  share  our  experiences  as 
practitioners to examine the reasons why sales execu-
tion strategies receive so little attention, and we outline 
The majority of startups fail to consider sales execution as part of their overall strategy. 
This  article  demonstrates  how  a  sales  execution  strategy  can  help  a  company  take  a 
product or service to market more efficiently and effectively by focusing on the customers 
that are key to generating revenue. Combined with techniques for recruiting effectively 
and measuring sales outcomes, a sales execution strategy helps technology startups ex-
ceed growth aspirations and potentially reduce or even eliminate the requirement for ex-
ternal investment. 
In this article, we first describe the focus of assistance currently given to startups and the 
reasons why sales execution strategies are often overlooked. Next, we outline recommend-
ations for developing, implementing, and supporting a sales execution strategy. Finally, 
we summarize the key points presented in the article. 
Business is like war in one respect. If its grand strategy is 
correct, any number of tactical errors can be made and 
yet the enterprise proves successful.
Robert E. Wood
Business Executive and Brigadier General (1879-1969)
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recommendations  that  leaders  of  technology  startups 
can use to develop and support an effective sales execu-
tion strategy.
Why Sales Execution Strategies Are Over-
looked
The technology adoption lifecycle (http://wikipedia.org
/wiki/Technology_adoption_lifecycle) is a staple of mar-
keting  and  entrepreneurial  education.  It  suggests  that 
the early majority and late majority categories of cus-
tomers  are  the  key  to  successful  growth  (Figure  1). 
These  categories  represent  influential  customers  with 
issues that reflect those of their industry at large. Focus-
ing on the early and late majority also helps organiza-
tions in “crossing the chasm” (sometimes referred to as 
“the valley of death”). 
The majority of early entrepreneurial efforts, both from 
a  product  development  perspective  and  in  terms  of 
marketing,  focus  on  creating  products  and  messages 
that  attract  innovators  and  early  adopters.  Typical  in-
cubation  efforts  do  nothing  but  reinforce  this  ap-
proach. Investors also look for commercial “proof”, as 
validated by communities of technology adopters and 
experts. Very few take the time to rigorously explore the 
extent  to  which  real  growth  is  feasible  through  the 
mainstream market.
There are many internal and external reasons why sales 
execution  strategies  are  under-emphasized  in  startup 
companies. Below, we describe three key barriers that 
hold  companies  back  from  recognizing  and  acting 
upon this gap:
1.  There  is  a  lack  of  available  sales  talent  and  sales 
leadership talent. Very often, the available talent pool 
consists of people who are experiencing the entrepren-
eurial world for the first time. With limited funds avail-
able, it is very difficult for startup companies to satisfy 
the remuneration expectations of high-performing ex-
corporate  leaders  and  sales  professionals.  Con-
sequently, many young businesses end up with sub-par 
sales  talent  who  have  been  schooled  in  the  corporate 
approach to customer engagement, but who do not un-
derstand the nuances of executing in an entrepreneuri-
al world.
2.  There  is  a  distinct  lack  of  clarity  and  consistency 
among investors. Investors, of course, are multi-dimen-
sional, and many do look for sales and marketing readi-
ness  as  they  explore  the  potential  for  investment. 
However,  they  vary  greatly  in  terms  of  what  they  are 
looking for to evaluate such readiness. During the due 
diligence  process,  entrepreneurs  tend  to  think  it  is  in 
their interests to exaggerate their sales funnel and over-
sell  their  partnerships.  This  practice  does  tend  to  in-
Figure 1. The Technology Adoption Lifecycle
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crease the likelihood of investment, but then everyone 
is confused when these companies later fail.
3. Startup operations are focused on feature develop-
ment, not on scaling sales. To scale sales, a company 
must put product feature development to one side in fa-
vour of adopting an objective mindset to the metrics of 
growth. For most startups, operations are still focused 
on feature development and not on scaling sales. This 
demands a fundamental mind-shift so that the opera-
tions side of the business can better support the efforts 
of  the  sales  team.  Key  components  that  are  often 
missed  are  realistic  product  development  strategies, 
lack  of  defined  operations  process,  and  poor  subcon-
tractor-developer relations.
Developing a Strategy
Selling is not telling. The most fundamental intent of a 
sales execution strategy is to create a systematic plat-
form  for  discovery  and  analysis.    A  well-considered 
sales  execution  strategy  should  provide  clear  answers 
to questions such as: 
• Who  are the most  influential  customers  in the target
market? 
• What are the poignant business issues that they face? 
• What are the tactical problems that are created? 
• How might the value proposition address these prob-
lems and what impact would it have? 
• How motivated might they be to buy,  given the value 
proposition? 
• Who would they consider the competition to be?
• How would the customers perceive the difference bet-
ween the startup and its competition? 
• What would they be prepared to pay? 
• How and for what would they pay?
• Who would they tell? 
Developing a sales execution strategy also requires in-
put from customers or prospects that have: i) signific-
ant problems they wish to solve; ii) genuine influence 
to purchase solutions; and iii) a willingness to tell their 
story.  With  input  from  customers,  the  answers  to  the 
questions above can help shape a compelling value pro-
position (the articulation of the value that your product 
or solution creates). Pilot projects also help in the devel-
opment of a sales execution strategy, particularly when 
they  are  used  to  build  reference  stories.  Returning  to 
the customer over time captures the changing nature of 
their issues and the changing demands they have of the 
value proposition.
The sales execution strategy becomes a working docu-
ment that contains the following information:
1. A clearly defined and tested product value proposi-
tion relating to the early and late majority customers in 
the market.
2. Tested price points for the product including quant-
ity discounts.
3. Adaptive pricing options along the adoption lifecycle.
4. Clear competitor differentiation.
5. A set of sales collateral built on the above points and 
supported by testimonials from pilot projects.
6.  A  clear  target  profile  of  the  early  and  late  majority 
customers to aid in the tactical implementation of the 
product sales.
7.  Timelines  for  product  release  based  on  a  realistic 
product development strategy.
8. A clearly defined plan for ongoing customer service.
Implementing a Strategy
There  are  three  major  considerations  that  determine 
the  most  appropriate  vehicle  (e.g.,  in-field  sales  staff, 
call centre/reseller, or a web-centric approach) for tac-
tically implementing a sales execution strategy:
1. The efficiency and appropriateness of the manner 
in  which  the  prospect  is  accessed  and  engaged.  The 
sales team should consider both the complexity of the 
decision-making process from the prospect’s perspect-
ive and the seniority of the decision makers. The more 
complex the process and the more senior the decision 
makers, the more likely a traditional field sales model is 
appropriate, which may require partners who can help 
execute the strategy. Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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2. The price of the product and its strategic impact on 
customers’  businesses.  The  lower  the  price  and  stra-
tegic impact, the more likely that the use of telephone 
sales professionals or resellers is appropriate. Further-
more, the use of digital media such as emails and on-
line shops can also be helpful.
3. The scale of the market and the depth of relation-
ships  required  to  provide  further  context.  The  larger 
the  market  and  the  lighter  the  touch,  the  more  likely 
that web-based lead generation and nurturing tools are 
required to automate and scale the approach used. 
Measuring Results
The  outcomes  of  a  sales  execution  strategy  must  be 
measurable. Specific and robust targets need to be set 
based on the outcome of a rich set of outputs.
The quality and quantity of activity (e.g., emails, calls, 
customer meetings) provides the foundation for all per-
formance.  This  leads  to  a  pipeline  containing  the  fol-
lowing:
     1. Leads
     2. Unqualified prospects
     3. Qualified opportunities
     4. Forecastable deals
These pipeline elements are interrelated and all should 
be planned for. For example, a company may start with 
the pessimistic assumption that 640 quality calls yield 
80 conversations, which result in 16 leads, four of which 
become prospects, two of which become qualified, and 
one  of  which  leads  to  a  deal.  Once  the  company  has 
made  a  number  of  calls,  generated  leads,  and  closed 
deals, these statistics can be adjusted to reflect the spe-
cific market. 
As described by one of this article’s authors, building a 
relevant and workable sales process, including a sales 
funnel, is “perhaps the most important aspect of a suc-
cessful sales strategy” (Davies, 2010; http://timreview.ca
/article/386) and it is critical to be realistic. The tempta-
tion and usual practice is to inflate the numbers (which 
end up becoming real to both the company and poten-
tial investors) in order to attract external funding, but 
the likelihood of failure as a consequence is very high. 
To keep things “real”, disregard opportunities that are 
really no more than conversations. 
To  further  ensure  the  sales  funnel  contains  genuine 
“winnable” opportunities, companies should also apply 
a simple qualification model. The simplest form of sales 
qualification  model  asks  four  simple  questions  for 
which the realistic organization seeks proof:
1. Budget. Does the prospect have access to sufficient 
funds to make this purchase? Can this be validated? 
2.  Authority.  Does  the  “buyer”  have  the  authority  to 
make a purchase decision? Can this be validated? 
3.  Need.  Is  there  a  compelling  business  need  for  the 
product  or  solution?  What  is  the  specific  value  to  the 
customer? Can it be verified that the need for a solution 
is meaningful to the customer?
4. Timescale. Has the timescale been established dur-
ing  which  the  need  must  be  addressed?  What  are  the 
specific steps and timings of the buying process?
Supporting a Sales Execution Strategy
When recruiting a sales team to roll out the sales execu-
tion strategy, we offer the following advice:
1.  Market  and  domain  experience  is  important  but 
can easily be overrated. A big rolodex is much less im-
portant than most people assume.
2. Recruit for demonstrable competency and capabil-
ity. Both of these attributes are predictors of successful 
execution.  Behavioural  interviewing  (exploring  past 
situations  and  the  candidate’s  actions  and  analysis  at 
the time) can assist in predicting probable future beha-
viours. 
3. Take the time to role play. Ask candidates to walk 
through  a  selling  conversation  for  their  current  com-
pany  or  product.  Do  they  ask  lots  of  questions  or  do 
they start pitching straight away? Do they have the cap-
ability to take control and build rapport or is the inter-
action forced and ”salesy”? For sales leaders, can they 
elevate  beyond  sales  theory  and  actually  sketch  out  a 
sales execution strategy for the business?
The  ugly  truth  is  that  only  a  small  percentage  of 
salespeople  are  top  sales  talents.  By  following  the 
points above you will maximize the probability of hir-
ing  an  individual  that  meets  your  requirements.  It  is Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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also  important  to  provide  ongoing  support  to  engage 
and motivate the sales staff. This will lead to higher per-
formance from all staff, not just the top sales talent.
Sales  staff  also  require  a  supporting  technical  infra-
structure. Cheap tools (e.g., web tracking, email auto-
mation,  and  customer  relationship  management  in 
particular) are so easy to acquire and implement that 
there is no excuse for even an unfunded business to be 
well-equipped to turn marketing efforts into real leads. 
The tools, of course, only tell half the story. It is up to 
the startup to implement with a degree of energy, and 
to  be  consistent  (not  perfect)  in  the  utilization  of  the 
tools and in the analysis of their impact.
Summary
To rapidly grow sales, startups need to:
1. Focus on required product features that are meaning-
ful to the early and late majority, not on features that 
only excite early adopters and technology enthusiasts.
2.  Structure  the  company  operations  to  enable  quick 
and rapid scaling to support the sales team.
3.  Develop  a  sales  execution  strategy  that  matches  a 
value proposition to the early majority.
4. Roll out the sales execution strategy using real met-
rics (e.g., ratio of qualified leads to closed sales, average 
cost of closed won vs closed lost sales) that are appro-
priate to the particular market.
5. Recruit effectively (as described above) to maximize 
the revenue potential and minimize the cost of sale.
6. Utilize effective technology to support the sales exe-
cution process.
7. Engage only in marketing activities that directly gen-
erate qualified leads.
By  following  the  above  guidelines,  startup  companies 
stand a better chance of achieving early revenue, which 
may  reduce  or  even  mitigate  the  requirement  for  ex-
ternal investment. Where investment is sought, this ap-
proach  will  also  give  both  the  investor  and  startup  a 
real  chance  at  maximizing  investment  for  a  safer  and 
more profitable return.Technology Innovation Management Review October 2011
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• Does my research or experience provide any new insights
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• Do I often find myself having to explain this topic when 
I meet people as they are unaware of its relevance?
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and frustration if someone had explained to me the is-
sues surrounding this topic?
• Am I constantly correcting misconceptions regarding
this topic?
• Am I considered to be an expert in this field?   For ex-
ample, do I present my research or experience at con-
ferences?
If your answer is "yes" to any of these questions, your 
topic is likely of interest to readers of the TIM Review.
When writing your article, keep the following points in 
mind:
• Emphasize the practical application of your insights 
or research.
• Thoroughly examine the topic;  don't leave the reader
wishing for more.
• Know your central theme and stick to it.
• Demonstrate your depth of understanding for the top-
ic, and that you have considered its benefits, possible
outcomes, and applicability.
• Write in a formal, analytical style. Third-person voice is
recommended;  first-person voice may also be accept-
able depending on the perspective of your article.
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4.  Begin  with  a  thought-provoking  quotation  that 
matches the spirit of the article. Research the source of 
your quotation in order to provide proper attribution.
5.  Include  a  2-3  paragraph  abstract  that  provides  the 
key messages you will be presenting in the article.
6.  Any  quotations  or  references  within  the  article  text 
need attribution. The URL to an online reference is pre-
ferred;  where  no  online  reference  exists,  include  the 
name  of  the  person  and  the  full  title  of  the  article  or 
book containing the referenced text. If the reference is 
from a personal communication, ensure that you have 
permission to use the quote and include a comment to 
that effect.
7. Provide a 2-3 paragraph conclusion that summarizes 
the article's main points and leaves the reader with the 
most important messages.
8. Include a 75-150 word biography.
9. If there are any additional texts that would be of in-
terest  to  readers,  include  their  full  title  and  location 
URL.
10. Include 5 keywords for the article's metadata to as-
sist search engines in finding your article.
11. Include any figures at the appropriate locations in 
the article, but also send separate graphic files at max-
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